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Abstract
The beliefs of a single agent are typically treated in logic and philosophy as a single
modality or epistemic attitude. I argue that it is better to treat belief as a family
of loosely related modalities. This approach to belief, along with mechanisms for
constructing modalities and for activating a modality that is appropriate for a speciﬁc
reasoning situation, seems to provide a much better model of the relation of belief to
intention in deliberative reasoning. I discuss this and other applications of this more
ﬂexible conception of belief and similar attitudes.
∗Thanks for comments to Sarah Buss, Jason Konek, David Manley, Daniel Singer, Peter Railton,1. Introduction: framing the problem
A lot has been written about the modularity of mind, but although I will be arguing for a
modular account of the attitudes, I want to set aside what has been said about this topic in
cognitive science and philosophy. In particular, I am not going to try to develop an account
that could be ﬁtted to the body of results obtained by cognitive psychologists. Nor do I
want to articulate a formal theory of special-purpose reasoning and ground it in psychology
by speculating about how it may correspond to a mental processing module.
Instead, I’m interested in general-purpose problem solving and its practical employment.
This includes game-playing, planning, and calculation, as well as explicit, articulated rea-
soning about language, objects in space, and events in time. In fact, it includes just about
anything that Allen Newell would put in the “intendedly rational band,”1 or at what he calls
“the knowledge level.”2 I believe that logic is the right tool for theorizing about the sort of
reasoning that takes place at this level. As a ﬁrst approximation, I take an analysis involving
a ﬁrst-order or even higher-order modal logic to be appropriate. Innovations from logical
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, such as nonmonotonic consequence relations, may be useful additions
to the logical framework.
For the purposes of this paper, I’m interested in practical reasoning: deliberation about
what goals to pursue, how to pursue them, and the relation of goals and plans to what to do
on a given occasion. I want a theoretical model that will engage this sort of reasoning—that,
in particular, will provide a useful theoretical framework for practical reasoning, viewed at
a fairly high level of abstraction.
The theory of programming languages and of program veriﬁcation provides a good model
for what I mean by “a fairly high level of abstraction.” A programming language is a
formalized medium for articulating complex imperatives for specialized agents. A semantics
for the language makes it possible to either prove that the instructions are correct, showing
that under certain conditions if the program is executed properly then the goals of the
program will be satisﬁed. Often a failed attempt at such a proof will draw attention to a
speciﬁc ﬂaw in the program.3
This approach depends heavily on logical theory; but at the same time it engages the
reasoning of an agent in signiﬁcant and useful ways. At the same time, it abstracts away
from many properties of the agent. It doesn’t matter what operating system the computer
uses, or how many processors the computer has, or (except for eﬃciency) to what extent par-
allelism is exploited in the program execution. It is irrelevant how the lower-level reasoning
is implemented at the circuit level, after the program has been compiled.
In this work, we have a successful combination of logical sophistication,4 a formal model
of the reasoner, and an abstraction from many low-level details that still is able to engage
signiﬁcant and useful features of the reasoning, and that can deliver useful results such as
correctness proofs.
1See [Newell, 1992, Chapter 7]. Newell’s division of psychological theory into various levels is very helpful
for methodological purposes.
2See [Newell, 1982].
3See, for instance, [Clarke et al., 1999].
4Temporal logics are used in this area.
1It is a bit of a stretch to extend this approach to cases that include human agents. With
computers, we have speciﬁcations of correct behavior at the circuit level, and of the compiler
that transforms a program into lower-level instructions. Despite the intense interest in recent
years in neuropsychology, we have no such thing for human beings and (almost) no such thing
for animals. Even so, I don’t think that the extension is overly painful. Knowledge-level
theories are appropriate and useful in robotics, and in this domain—even though we might
have a speciﬁcation of the agent as a computer running a particular operating system, the
environments with which the agent has to deal are so rich and full of uncertainty that the
importance of a speciﬁcation at this level diminishes to little or nothing.5
When knowledge-level accounts of practical reasoning are used in robotics, they are
usually incorporated in a “Belief-Intention-Desire” (or “BDI”) model.6 In the simplest case,
we imagine that the agent has goals, in the form of a set of desired world-states.7 The agent
also has beliefs about the current world-state, as well as beliefs about the preconditions and
immediate eﬀects of actions in the agent’s repertoire. Means-end reasoning then produces
plans—sequences of actions that the agent believes will achieve the goal. One of these plans
is selected and turned into an intention.8 Intentions are then scheduled for execution, and
normally the agent will then act on them.
Now, we can often reliably infer a (humanlike) agent’s intentions, and can observe an
agent’s actions. The BDI model connects beliefs to intentions and actions. Even though
there is some slippage in scheduling and execution, some uncertainty about desires, and
alternative hypotheses about beliefs may be available to explain the observations, we do
have evidential connections that can be pretty reliable. Developing a BDI-like architecture
by ﬁlling in the details and elaborating the components could improve these connections.
In common sense BDI behavioral prediction one infers an intention (and hence, under
the right circumstances, an action) from a belief in the presence of a supposed desire. For
instance, if my wife is looking for the car keys and I tell her I left them on the kitchen
counter, I’ll expect her to look there. Conversely, in common sense behavioral explanation
one infers a belief from an action, in the presence of a supposed intention. If I see my wife
looking on the kitchen counter before going out to get in the car, I may infer that she believes
that she doesn’t have the car keys.
2. Methodological considerations
2.1. Applications and examples
Like other areas of contemporary philosophy, epistemology is too disengaged from challenging
applications, and too driven by armchair examples, which often are far-fetched and unre-
alistic. This tendency is harmful in many ways. (1) Typically, realistic examples are more
interesting and fruitful for philosophical purposes than contrived, unrealistic examples. (2)
5The literature in this area is extensive. See, however, [Doherty, 2004], [Nebel, 2002], [Reiter, 2001], and
[Shanahan and Rundell, 2004],
6The original idea was proposed in [Bratman et al., 1988]. See [Wooldridge, 2000] for a more extensive
treatment of the topic, together with a formal language for reasoning about BDI agents.
7This account of desires is in fact much too simple, but it will do for our purposes here.
8Further desires, in the form of preferences for some plans over others, may play a role in the selection.
2It is usually easier to produce systematic variations in realistic examples, providing evidence
that can be connected with some conﬁdence to generalizations, and eventually, to theories.
(3) There is no reliable philosophical methodology for constructing purely imaginary exam-
ples, so philosophical inquiry that is driven by these examples tends to be capricious and
unsystematic. (4) It is not as if we understand all the simple examples that are relevant to
any area of philosophy, and so are forced to construct more complex cases in order to test our
theories. It is easy to construct simple examples that challenge any area of philosophy. (5)
Just as hard cases tend to make bad law, far-fetched examples tend to make bad philosophy,
because we simply are not likely to have robust, reliable intuitions about bizarre examples.
The examples I use in this paper will, I hope, be realistic; in one instance (Section 4), I
contrast a realistic example with a product of philosophical imagination.
2.2. Decision theory
Although I will be proposing an alternative to accounts of decision-making that use expected
utility, what I will say is meant to be compatible with decision-theoretic approaches, as long
as these are not applied generally, to all decisions whatsoever.
The model of decision-making developed in [Savage, 1972] requires an agent to bring a
probability measure and a utility function to bear on every situation calling for a decision.
The simplest way to achieve this would be to insist that the agent is equipped with an
all-purpose probability measure and decision function, deﬁned over a huge space including
every hypothetical outcome with which the agent may have to deal.
This is clearly unworkable in many realistic deliberative situations. Even if we only require
that in any decision situation the agent must be able to construct a probability measure and
utility function that is appropriate for the situation, the probabilities and utilities are not
always available. In fact, the ingredients we need for a decision-theoretic calculation can’t
be had except in cases with relatively few variables, with limited interactions between these
variables, and with a relatively large amount of time for reﬂection. The use of computers has
enlarged the cases where we can hope for such solutions, but even so such cases are relatively
rare in practice.
That is why we need an alternative model of decision-making that appeals to reasons
and reasoning, even if is not rational in the decision-theoretic sense. Such a model is also
more faithful to the patterns we ﬁnd in human decision-making.9
2.3. Intentions require beliefs
I will assume the following principle: intentions presuppose the appropriate beliefs.
That is, there can be no intention without the appropriate beliefs. Suppose, for instance,
that I approach a door that I closed an hour ago, leaving it unlocked, with the intention
9I am not saying that we should discard decision theory. It is ﬁne in the cases where the deliberative
situation can be modeled with global probabilities and utilities. But most deliberative situations simply can’t
be modeled this way. Perhaps some day we will learn how to combine decision theory with more ﬂexible and
qualitative forms of reasoning. That too, would be ﬁne. But at the moment, we have to use many models
of deliberation, if we want to be appropriately general.
3to open it by simply turning the handle and pulling. Then I must believe that the door is
unlocked, even if I don’t have this belief explicitly in mind. If I didn’t believe that the door
was unlocked, I might well try to open it by turning the handle and pulling, hoping that it’s
unlocked. But under these circumstances, I can’t intend to open it this way.
The idea that an action aiming at a desired outcome cannot take place without the belief
that the outcome will be achieved is close to the principle that I just stated. But I do not
accept this idea.
The diﬀerence between the two is best clariﬁed using a decision that could be managed
in two diﬀerent ways by a deliberating agent: a probability-based style and a belief-based
style. Suppose that I’m playing a game of ﬁve-card stud poker. The last card has been dealt.
My four visible cards show a pair of jacks, and nothing better. In fact, all I have is a pair of
jacks. One opponent is left in the game. The pot amounts to $500. Her hand shows a king,
but no pairs. It is her turn to bet; she bets $250. Let’s suppose that my choices are either
to call her bet or to fold. If her down card is a king, she will win if I call her bet; otherwise,
I win if I call her bet.
Case 1. I use decision theory. The utility is given by the amount of my stake in the
outcome situation. Assuming I have a stake of $1000, the utility of folding is 1000. The
utility of calling the bet if she doesn’t have a pair of kings is 1750. The utility of calling
the bet if she has a pair of kings is 750. Having counted the cards, I take the probability
that she has a pair of kings to be .0571. The expected utility of folding, then, is 1000. The
expected utility of calling the bet is (.0571×750)+(.9429×1750), or about 1693. I maximize
expected utility and call the bet.
Case 2. I have observed my opponent bluﬃng before. I know that the likelihood of her
having a pair or kings is very low. Taking these to be reasons, I form the belief that she
doesn’t have a pair of kings. I call the bet, because according to my belief this will net me
$750.
In Case 1, it would be wrong to say that I intend to win $750. I call the bet, hoping to
win $750, and of course I’m trying to win $750, but I don’t intend to win because the losing
outcome is not ruled out by what I believe.
In Case 2, I do intend to win $750. I have the intention because I have formed the
appropriate belief about what cards my opponent holds.
It is the same if we contrapose. Suppose that in Case 2 you take me aside and persuade
me that my opponent might have a pair of kings. Having given up the belief that she
doesn’t have a pair of kings, I have to give up my intention to win by calling the bet. But
the discarded intention may not prevent me from calling the bet. I can perfectly well say
“Yes, she might have that pair; but I still intend to call her,” elaborating by saying she
probably is bluﬃng. In eﬀect, I fall back on a qualitative version of Case 1. What I can’t
coherently say is “Yes, she might have that pair; but I still intend to win the pot.” Again,
we see that the intention requires the appropriate belief.
There may be cases where an agent acts on both sorts of deliberations, and cases where
it is hard to tell whether an intention on a hope is in play. But there are also clear cases of
both sorts of deliberate action. The distinction between acting with the intention to achieve
a goal and acting in the hope that a desired outcome will be achieved is well grounded in
4common sense, and intuitions about the clear cases are very robust. In fact, the principle
that intentions presuppose beliefs is, I think, entirely plausible.
This means, among other things, that situations that call for us to form intentions can
act as inducements to provide the requirements for the intentions by acquiring appropriate
beliefs. Suppose, for instance, that I have a standing goal not to overspend, and that my
immediate problem is to decide whether to buy a new computer that I want. I need to eﬀect
this decision by forming an intention to buy the computer while not overspending or and
intention to refrain from buying it.
In this situation, I need an appropriate belief. Suppose that there is just one pivotal
issue: whether I can aﬀord to buy the computer. Then somehow, I have to either form a
belief that I can aﬀord it or form a belief that I can’t aﬀord it. In resolving the issue, of
course, I might gather information about my ﬁnances. But if this information doesn’t suﬃce
to produce a belief as to whether the computer is aﬀordable, I can also adjust what counts
as aﬀordable in one direction or another. Otherwise, like an epistemic Buridan’s Ass, I will
be stuck.
An agent that must, in some cases, form intentions in order to make decisions, may ﬁnd
itself in situations in which a decision must be made, but the available information does not
suﬃce to precipitate a belief. The need for mechanisms to deal with wich quandaries has
consequences for how beliefs must function in the overall cognitive architecture, motivating
a modular picture of an agent’s beliefs. In Section 5, we will see how this plays out.
3. A proposal about belief
Later in this paper I’ll present some logical theories. At the moment, I just want to present
the general idea.
First, stipulate that we are concentrating on belief as a practical attitude: the “B”
attitude of a BDI agent.
On a monolithic picture of practical belief, there is a single, ideally consistent general-
purpose pro-attitude, “belief,” that applies generally across the various practical situations
that an agent faces in life. An agent has a single “belief base” that is applied to whatever
decisions may come its way. Of course, the beliefs are updated—perhaps nonmonotonically—
in light of experience. But on any single occasion when an agent is bringing beliefs to bear
on several independent decisions, it will be drawing on the same, general-purpose attitude.
And monolithic belief is dynamically inﬂexible: it can only be updated by rational revision
in the light of new evidence. On some idealizations this update may be nonmonotonic, so
beliefs could be lost as the result of observations. But the beliefs cannot change without new
information.
On this view, an agent’s beliefs are like the goods in a ready-made clothing store. There
is a procedure for updating the inventory. Independently, a customer can go to the store
and ﬁnd clothing. The supplies of clothing are unrelated to the needs of the customer; they
depend only on the state of the inventory.
I propose to think of the belief shop as more like a gentleman’s tailor. The tailor keeps
materials and tools for making clothing. A customer goes to the tailor, is measured, and
5orders custom-make clothing.
I want to say that appropriate beliefs for a particular practical purpose are manufactured
for the occasion, and that the manufacturing process may involve reasoning. Instead of a
single belief attitude, we have an open-ended and loosely organized family of belief-like
attitudes. The family is open-ended because there are mechanisms for constructing these
attitudes. And a new belief-like attitude may be constructed for a particular occasion.10
A constraint on the belief-producing reasoning that enforces joint consistency—in eﬀect,
requiring that all the beliefs that the reasoning produces should be part of a single consistent
theory—would make the modular account of belief equivalent to the monolithic one. But
(for reasons I’ll get to) we do not want to impose such a constraint. The beliefs that are
appropriate for one practical occasion may be inconsistent with those that are appropriate
for another.
Let’s assume the view of beliefs as modalities, characterized semantically by relations over
possible worlds. Although it makes many idealizations,11 this picture of epistemic attitudes
has been successfully used in many applications having to do with reasoning about knowledge
and belief.12 This makes belief a modality. Belief is realized syntactically as an operator
taking formulas into formulas, Where φ is a formula and a denotes an agent, [a ]φ is
a formula, expressing the proposition that the agent denoted by a believes the proposition
expressed by φ. The usual interpretation of [a ] associates it with modal frames that are
euclidean and serial; this corresponds to the axiomatization called KD45 in [Fagin et al.,
1995].
The logical model that I’m recommending is not a great departure from this approach—
but instead of equipping each agent a with a single belief operator [a ], I give an agent
a family of belief operators [a,i ]. As before, these operators take formulas into formulas.
Where φ is a formula, [a,i ]φ is a formula representing the proposition that epistemic module
i of agent a believes the proposition that φ. As before, each operator is interpreted using a
euclidean, serial relation. The resulting logic looks at ﬁrst like a multiagent modal logic of
the familiar sort, but in fact intra-agent modality is diﬀerent in some important ways from
inter-agent modality. In the inter-agent case, agents reason about one another’s attitudes
in much the same way that they reason about any other feature of their worlds. In the
intra-agent case, modules of the same agent access one another in transactions that transmit
information directly. We might expect such an important diﬀerence to aﬀect the logic.13
The indices representing epistemic modules needn’t be unstructured. In fact, it is con-
venient to think of them as bundles of features representing the provenance and status of
the information contained by the associated module. In fact, the main thing I want to do
in the rest of this paper is to consider some features that could be used to organize these
information modules, and to suggest how they might be used in reasoning.
10Of course, there is such a thing as habit, and often the reasoning is minimal and routine.
11Logical omniscience is the hardest to swallow of of these idealizations.
12See [Fagin et al., 1995].
13In unpublished work, I explore the use of a non-normal modal logic for distributed belief. That is because
[a,i][a,j ]φ is peculiar if the contents of j are not accessible to i. The options are to treat it as false or
as truthvalueless in this case; I choose the former option, which produces a logic like S3. But these details
are not important for present purposes.
6I will begin with a problem from the philosophical literature.
4. Kripke’s Pierre puzzle
The Pierre puzzle is stated in [Kripke, 1979]. Brieﬂy, Pierre grew up in France, where he
learned about “Londre,” always hearing charming things about Londre. “Londre est jolie,”
he says to himself, and continues to believe accordingly. Later he moves to an unpleasant
part of London, learns English by immersion, and believes that London is not at all pleasant.
He never realizes that Londre and London are the same city.
Although it doesn’t constitute an entire solution, a modular account of belief seems to
be a necessary condition for resolving this problem. (I am assuming it is out of the question
to suppose that some beliefs are in English and some in French.) You can’t begin to say
anything very helpful about the puzzle unless you associate two belief modules with Pierre:
one associated with his life in France and the other with his life in England. Certainly,
there may be a lot of overlap between the two, but the overlap needn’t be complete—
in unusual cases, there may even be unresolved contradictions—and cases where Pierre’s
second language learning is imperfect may induce such discrepancies. When Pierre hears
French, or speaks French, or even thinks to himself in French,14 the life-in-France module
is activated. When Pierre hears English, or speaks English, or even thinks to himself in
English, the life-in-England module is activated.
As I said in Section 2.1, I believe that artiﬁcial examples tend to make for artiﬁcial
philosophy. Whether or not you agree with me about this, I would also like to suggest that
realistic, and if possible naturally occurring examples are more likely to be instructive than
ones that are fantastic and contrived. Let me illustrate this point by contrasting the case of
Drew McDermott’s sink with the Pierre example.
I was told this as a true story, but haven’t veriﬁed it. What makes it especially funny is
the fact that McDermott is a computer scientist who at one time worked on planning.
Once, McDermott’s sink was so badly blocked that he had to remove the U-joint.
He put a bucket under the sink, loosened the joint with a wrench, and the water
in the sink ran into the bucket. Several minutes later he had to get the bucket
out of the way, so he took it out and emptied it into the sink.
It seems plausible to me to say that, when he emptied the bucket, McDermott believed
that the water would go on the ﬂoor, though perhaps the belief wasn’t activated at the
time.15 But also, in a way, he must have believed at the same time that the water would go
down the drain. According to the model of practical reasoning I subscribed to in Section 1,
we can’t explain his action of pouring the water into the sink without ascribing to him the
belief that the water would go down the drain. Drew’s probable reaction to this mishap is
instructive; most likely he was startled. but not at all surprised. He was startled because he
expected the water to go down the drain. He wasn’t surprised because he knew it wouldn’t.
14I only assume that some thinking is accompanied by subvocalization. I certainly do not assume that all
thinking is associated with a language.
15I even think it’s plausible even if emptying the bucket was automatic. Even automatic, habitual actions
are intentional, and so have to be based on beliefs.
7As with Pierre, we can come to grips with this example by supposing that belief is
modular. To me, the realistic story is much more compelling, and I think it is likely to be
more instructive. But more important for my present purposes—because it is more closely
connected to reasoning than lapses of attention—is the interaction between belief and the
appreciation of risk.
5. Risk
Consider a case where a probability measure and a utility function are not available in a
situation calling for reasoned action. An agent that fell back on BDI reasoning in these
cases would either be reckless or paralyzed if the beliefs weren’t tailored to the occasion. If
the standards for belief are overly relaxed for the decision situation, then hearsay evidence,
as well as long chains of defeasible inference, could justify a belief. Then the monolithic
agent would be reckless: eating a mushroom just because an inexpert friend has declared
it to be safe, or passing on a hill because there was no oncoming traﬃc on the last several
hills. Suppose, on the other hand, that the standards are stringent. Then the agent would
be paralyzed: unable to eat a spinach salad because it might be contaminated, or unable to
back up a car because someone might have just crawled behind it.
In fact, however, human beliefs are inﬂuenced by a sense of risk.16 Without any change
in the available evidence, a belief can disappear in the presence of risk, and can appear in
the absence of risk.17 Contrast the following two cases.
(5.1) Normally, when I park my car, I turn oﬀ the lights. I park my car downtown,
near a service station, and leave it to do some errands. Ten minutes away from
the car, it occurs to me that I don’t remember turning oﬀ the lights.
(5.2) Normally, when I park my car, I turn oﬀ the lights. I park my car at a remote
trailhead, 12 miles from the nearest highway, and set oﬀ on day hike. Ten
minutes away from the car, it occurs to me that I don’t remember turning oﬀ
the lights.
The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Example 5.1 and Example 5.2 is risk. In the ﬁrst
case, I can easily produce the belief that I turned the lights oﬀ, based on the (defeasible)
reason that I usually turn them oﬀ. In the second case, I can’t produce it. If I’m a worrying
type, I may even be able to produce the belief that I didn’t turn them oﬀ.
This mechanism of adjusting beliefs to risk would not be possible with monolithic belief—
in the absence of new information, there would be no adjustment to be made. But if beliefs
are ad hoc, and if one criterion for choosing the beliefs that are appropriate for a reasoning
situation is a qualitative measure of the expected utility of acting on them, we can begin
to explain how such adjustments can occur. In this example, we can assume that the only
relevant proposition is whether the lights are oﬀ, so—if we simplify and think of a modality
as a set of propositions—the issue is whether to believe a unit set of propositions, and the
credibility of the set is equal to the credibility of the proposition that the lights are oﬀ. In
16For related work, see [Armendt, 2010]. Armendt is working in the framework of subjective probability,
but the ideas are very similar.
17I described cases like this in [Thomason, 1987].
8both cases, this credibiity is signiﬁcant, but lower than the highest level. Say it is .8 on a
scale of 0 to 1. In Example 5.2, the badness of the outcome of acting on the belief is high.
Say it is −7 on a scale of −10 to +10. This attaches a risk factor of .8×−7 = −.56 to acting
on the belief. This high risk may prevent the supposition that the lights are on from being
used as a belief in this practical situation.
In many deliberative situations, and especially when the risk is high, or there is emo-
tional involvement, or there is social pressure to have reasons for decisions, we seem to be
condemned to form intentions backed up by reasons. And these reasons will have to function
as beliefs in the deliberative situation.
I am supposing that most hikers in the situation that I describe would have to deliberate
in belief-based mode. Suppose that the rational thing to do in this case, according to the
decision-theoretic model, were to ﬂip a coin and then proceed with the hike or turn back to
check the car lights, depending on the outcome of the coin toss. I would expect that few
hikers could muster the detachment required to adopt this protocol and proceed with the
hike, supposing this to be the recommended action. Without a belief that the lights are oﬀ,
worry would prevent the hiker from following through.
We have seen that an intention to hike and then drive home requires a belief that the
lights are oﬀ. On the monolithic model of beliefs, there would be no mechanism for forming
the appropriate belief. There is no way to get new information about the car lights without
walking back to the car. So an intention to hike and then drive home would be impossible on
this model. But in fact some hikers in this situation, condemned to belief-based deliberation,
will decide to continue with the hike.
In this case, and in many similar cases that will occur to you, an agent can’t act without
the appropriate beliefs. An agent in this predicament, who is inclined to adopt a risky
course of action, is in a state of belief hunger; to continue with the hike, the agent needs
the appropriate belief. In this case, and in fact typically, reasons for adopting the belief
are easy to ﬁnd. The hiker has a habit of turning oﬀ the car lights; this is the norm. It is
most likely that in fact the lights are on. These are the resources that we usually appeal to
in forming defeasible beliefs, and they apply in this case. Of course, belief hunger and its
satisfaction has its pathologies, including beliefs formed in the face of compelling evidence
to the contrary, and self-deceptive beliefs. But I’m not interested in the pathology here; I do
not want to say that the hiker who adopts a belief that the lights are oﬀ and proceeds with
the hike is epistemologically defective, or that the process of forming the belief is in any way
unreasonable, even if it is somewhat risky.18
I hope it’s clear that I have nothing against deliberation that appeals to calculated
expected utility. I certainly don’t want to do away with this method of deciding what to
do. Often, tradeoﬀs between the desirability of outcomes and the likelihood of achieving
them need to be reconciled in practical decision-making, and these tradeoﬀs call for such
18One way to solve the problem of repeated decisions that according to game theory would best be solved
by randomizing, but that require a reasoned decision, is to enhance a randomizing method with social or
even religious approval. The ancient Greeks and Romans used the ﬂight of birds and the entrails of animal
sacriﬁces to make decisions, some at least of which match this description. Plains indians apparently used
the motions of insects to decide where they would hunt.
9calculations. How, then, does the picture I’m painting diﬀer from, say, Leonard Savage’s?19
Well, I don’t take expected utility to be the whole story about how even an ideally
rational agent reasons in practical situations; in fact, I think it doesn’t ﬁt the reasoning in
most cases. I diﬀer from Savage in not wanting to postulate global, all-purpose utility and
probability functions, and in denying that probability functions make beliefs unnecessary in
practical reasoning. I think that sometimes people act on intentions, and sometimes they act
on hopeful expectations. Intentions require beliefs, and these beliefs can be manufactured ad
hoc for the decision-making situation at hand. Furthermore, I am willing to allow qualitative
and approximate methods for calculating utility.20
6. An application to cooperative reasoning21
A great deal has been written since the publication of [Stalnaker, 1972] about the dynamics
of the common ground in a conversation.22 Far less has been said about how the common
ground is initialized. Almost nothing is said about how it can be initialized so as to promote
modal mutuality.23 The requirement of mutuality for the common ground is strongly mo-
tivated by theoretical considerations. It is also supported by linguistic evidence; see [Clark
and Marshall, 1981, 415–420].
But this requirement raises a problem: how can we account for the reasoning that gives
rise to a sense of mutuality? How, for instance, when we begin a conversation with someone
on an airplane, can we ﬁnd a common ground?
Clark and Marshall, as well as many other authors, speak of the attitude associated
with the common ground of a conversation as if it were a matter of the mutual beliefs or
even the mutual knowledge of the participants. But neither alternative works. The attitude
can’t be knowledge, because conversations can easily presuppose what is false. It can’t
be belief, because the rules of conversation don’t require the participants to go away from
the talk exchange believing whatever they have assumed for the sake of their conversation.
Situations can arise in which you don’t entirely trust what someone is saying, but don’t
want to be rude or to disrupt the conversation with objections.24 In these cases you simply
19See [Savage, 1972].
20Many such methods are discussed in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence literature. In fact, there is an extensive
literature on qualitative preferences, on calculating qualitative preferences over plans, and on integrating
these preferences with planning algorithms. See [Baier and McIlraith, 2008] for a recent survey. Most of
this work does not yet consider cases where uncertainty, risk, and the consequent need for expected utility
is present; but see [Fargier and Sabbadin, 2005].
21There is some overlap between what I say in this section and the motivating parts of [Thomason, 2000]
and [Thomason, 2002].
22Stalnaker uses the term ‘presuppositions’. Here, I use Herbert Clark’s term. See [Clark and Marshall,
1981].
23Many others use the term ‘common’, referring, for instance, to ‘common knowledge’. I prefer ‘mutual’,
because it is less likely to be confused with other group attitudes. For details about the logic of mutuality,
see [Fagin et al., 1995, Chapter 6].
24This could be a matter of genuine distrust, as in a conversation with an overeager salesman. But it can
also happen in story-telling. When we hear an entertaining story that is presented as recalled history, we
may not be sure which parts of it are fact, which are enhanced, and which are entirely ﬁctional. Usually, it
isn’t important to sort this out.
10suspend disbelief. In eﬀect, this means that you create an ad hoc attitude of acceptance-
for-the-sake-of-the conversation.25 Some of the things accepted in this way might serve as
beliefs for certain purposes. We might be quite conﬁdent that other such things are false.
Notice that much the same thing can happen in reading a work of ﬁction. You can learn a
lot about the Napoleanic Wars by reading Dostoyevsky, but of course you shouldn’t believe
that all the people, places, and events in War and Peace are historical.
This idea of an ad hoc conversational modality goes a long way towards explaining
the mutuality of the common ground. We initialize this modality by tailoring it to our
interlocutors—by putting things in it that we have good reason to suppose they will put in
the modality they are constructing for us. We can provide a mechanism for constructing the
modality by supposing that learning a proposition is more complicated than simply adding
the information it contains to a basket full of beliefs. We need to tag what we have learned
with background information. How did we learn it? Did we learn it under circumstances
that we would expect to apply to other people? What sort of people would these be? If
what we have learned is enriched in this way, constructing an ad hoc attitude might just be
a matter of selecting propositions with certain features.
You can ﬁnd an informal version of this proposal in [Clark and Schober, 1989]. They put
the idea in terms of speech communities.
The common ground between two people—here, Alan and Barbara—can be divided
conceptually into two parts. Their communal common ground represents all the knowl-
edge, beliefs, and assumptions they take to be universally held in the communities to
which they mutually believe they both belong. Their personal common ground rep-
resents all the mutual knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions they have inferred from
personal experience with each other.
Alan and Barbara belong to many of the same cultural communities ...
1. Language: American English, Dutch, Japanese
2. Nationality: American, German, Australian
3. Education: University, high school, grade school
4. Place of Residence: San Francisco, Edinburgh, Amsterdam ...
There is more about the problem of mutuality in [Thomason, 2000, Thomason, 2002],
and in fact a full solution to the problem has other ingredients. But treating the belief-
like attitudes associated with conversations as ﬂexible, ad hoc modalities is an important
component.
7. Time and social pressure26
In situations calling for a reasoned decision, time pressure can enhance belief hunger. Social
pressure can have a similar eﬀect.
25Stalnaker makes this suggestion in [Stalnaker, 1975].
26There is some overlap here with [Thomason, 2007].
11Philosophers of practical reasoning have paid attention to many sorts of practical patholo-
gies, some of them invented. But little attention has been paid to dithering.
Consider a nervous driver at a stop sign at a busy intersection on a dark night. He needs
to drive across the intersection. He looks left. A car zooms by from that direction. He looks
right. It’s clear. He looks left, it’s clear. But wait—he can’t see what’s going on to the
right, and doesn’t believe it’s clear anymore. So he looks right. He repeats the process until
he realizes that he’ll never get across this way. Time is pressing. But he can’t move unless
the road is clear. So he lowers his standards, saying to himself “If it was clear to the right
a second ago it’s clear now.” And he hits the gas. Sometimes, of course, there may be no
intention to cross the intersection, and no belief—just a sort of desperate hope. But I think
that in this sort of case the need to act will sometimes induce a belief.
Jury duty can produce an enhanced and extreme case of pressure to believe. For respon-
sible jurors, anyway, the duties call for a reasoned decision, and require certain beliefs about
the facts of the case. In many cases, the risk factor (at least, the moral risk factor) can be
high. But a holdout member of a jury can be under severe time pressure, as well as social
pressure, to reach a decision. Most often, I suspect, this pressure induces a belief that might
not otherwise have come into being.
8. The hypothetical dimension
Supposing blends into entertaining, entertaining blends into positing, positing blends into
occasional belief, and occasional belief blends into entrenched, global belief. On the model
that I’m advocating, there is no real need to draw a line at a particular place in order to
separate genuine from pseudo beliefs. But the practicalizing mechanism that assembles an
attitude for a decision-making situation would need to take these distinctions into account.
To take two extremes, we would not want something supposed purely for the sake of argument
to ever be practicalized. On the other hand, a supposition about what my name is should
be generally and freely available in just about any reasoning situation.
In fact, if we don’t draw a sharp line at any point in the continuum between supposing and
believing, there is still no diﬃculty in preventing imagination and ﬁction from contaminating
serious deliberation. The same mechanisms that apply when we gather information from
external sources can and do apply when we assemble information from our own attitudes in
order to construct an ad hoc, practical belief attitude. In Section 5, I included estimated
credibility, adjusted for risk, among these factors. If things assumed for the sake of argument
or for the sake or a conversation, or for following a work of ﬁction, were assigned credibility
0, this should suﬃce to keep them at bay in practical situations.
But in fact I don’t think that credibility is the only disbelief-inducing mechanism. Tempo-
rary suppositions—assumptions for the sake of argument, or for contingency planning—can
be forgotten once they have served their purpose. There is no point in maintaining a sup-
position that is of no future use. And somehow it doesn’t seem plausible that we don’t
practicalize whatever we have understood in a conversation or read in a work of ﬁction
simply because these things have low credibility. Perhaps assumptions can be labeled as
impractical or hypothetical in various ways.
129. Activated belief and interactions between modules
Thinking of pro-attitudes as modular, as resources that can be marshaled and brought to
bear on a particular problem, would allow agents to follow a more relaxed approach to stor-
ing and maintaining declarative information. This information could be stored in modules
devoted to speciﬁc topics; these modules could be organized along taxonomic lines. Although
consistency is always desirable, it would not be vital to check ensure global consistency across
modules, as long as consistency is monitored when information is gathered from diﬀerent
modules for some speciﬁc purpose.27
This way of organizing things has turned out to be important in managing large-scale
knowledge bases. If the task is actually more a matter of constructing a knowledge base
than of acquiring large amounts discrete, unrelated information—that is, if the task is to
decide how to formalize a topic and provide axioms and a reasoning mechanism—then it
is very diﬃcult to make progress on large scale repositories without modularizing the task.
For a description of how this works out in the context of a speciﬁc knowledge representation
project, see [Guha, 1991].
This approach, of course, will not work without procedures for collecting and organizing
information from diﬀerent modules. The architecture that suggested by this idea would
involve more or less independent loci for representing, storing, and managing information,
with general mechanisms for transferring the information. Some attention (but not enough)
has been given to providing a logic for this sort of architecture.28
10. Minsky, the society of mind and the emotions
Although I think that something like the sort of epistemology I advocate here is pretty
inevitable if you take seriously the idea that epistemology should have something to do with
the sort of reasoning that is used in problem solving, I suspect that it will seem pretty radical
to traditional epistemologists. I would like to mention brieﬂy what Marvin Minsky has to
say about the architecture of human thought, if only to diﬀerentiate what I am doing from
his views, and to point out that modular epistemology can be far more radical.
Minsky’s published work on this topic goes back to [Minsky, 1985], but the most recent
and comprehensive statement of the ideas is [Minsky, 2006].
If societies can be said to reason, the reasoning would have to be distributed, involving
separate modules that may communicate seldom or never. And societies can be anarchic, and
to the extent that anyone can be said to be in charge, the leadership can change frequently,
and change in ways that are disorderly. Minsky wants to transfer these features of societies
to the mind.
Minsky has surprisingly little (surprisingly, because Minsky’s background, after all, is in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence) to say about how this idea would play out in terms of reasoning, and
27This purpose could be to produce the active beliefs to be directed at a speciﬁc problem. But modules
may need from time to time to acquire information from one another for internal maintenance purposes.
28For many years, John McCarthy has stressed the need for a “logic of context” and made suggestions
about what such a logic should look like. As far as I know, [McCarthy and Buvaˇ c, 1998] is the latest of his
papers on the topic. Also see [Thomason, 2005].
13especially in relation to problem solving. Although [Minsky, 2006] contains many suggestive
comments that could be applied to reasoning, and especially to the interactions between
emotions and reasoning, there is no systematic or detailed account of the reasoning mecha-
nisms. However, it is clear that he imagines that humans can invoke a variety of reasoning
styles, that these styles are related to cognitive resources that can be activated to a greater
or lesser extent, that the emotions play a role in the activation, and that this process is more
or less unruly.
The account of belief that I have proposed is committed to none of these things. In
fact, it is conﬁned to rational or at least reasonable epistemology. On the model that I have
proposed, beliefs are in fact resources that can be activated and deactivated. But I think
of this process as rule-governed, driven by the needs of a problem situation, and reasonable,
even if not rational in a strictly decision-theoretic sense.
I don’t doubt that there are interactions—in both directions—between human emotions
and human beliefs and other truth-directed attitudes, and that here Minsky has many in-
sights to oﬀer, even if he seems to be unwilling to develop these insights. In fact, a weakness
of BDI models is that they have little or nothing to say about the origin or maintenance of
desires, and any account of this would have to take the emotions into consideration. But I
don’t think that such an account would need to be as unruly as Minsky seems to think.
11. Conclusions
Agents who reason in the way I have suggested we in fact reason will have a way to abuse the
process of deliberation. But human beings seem to be such agents. Others have noticed this;
some have taken a perverse sort of pride in it.29 But we can admit that the mechanism is
available to us, without suggesting that its abuse is a good thing. In fact, mature, thoughtful
people will tend to avoid such abuse; this is part of what it is to be a mature, thoughtful
person.
I don’t doubt that for some combinations of deliberating agents and deliberative prob-
lems, belief-based intentions are not the best way of reasoning.30 But belief-based planning
and intention formation may well be a good general-purpose method for agents with human
cognitive capacities. In any case, we seem to be stuck with this method—condemned to it,
as I said, in many of the deliberative situations we have to deal with.
In this paper, I have tried to suggest what belief would need to be like for agents in this
position. It turns out, if I’m right, that belief would have to be diﬀerent from what many
philosophers and decision scientists have imagined it to be.
29Ralph W. Emerson, with his “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines,” is an example. Emerson apparently is thinking of consistency in
beliefs from one occasion to another, and feels that self-reliant men are above such things.
30Special-purpose computers and chess playing may be such a combination, for instance.
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